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Abstract
While research on domestic abuse in economics has to date almost exclusively focused on physical
violence, research in other disciplines has documented that abusive males frequently also use sab-
otage tactics to interfere with the employability and job performance of the victim. This paper
puts forward a theoretical framework that rationalizes why men may use labor market sabotage
“instrumentally” to thwart their partners’ training or career efforts. The model predicts a non-
monotonic relationship between the gender wage gap and intrahoushold sabotage committed by
abusive males. There are no one-size-fit-all solutions when it comes to reducing the incidence of
economic abuse. Instead, specific measures have to be targeted at different types of households.
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1. Introduction
The term domestic abuse typically evokes images of physical and sexual violence. However,
researchers across a range of social science disciplines have long understood that a typical pattern
of domestic abuse also includes economic abuse as a tactic used by perpetrators to control their
partners’ behavior (Tjaden and Thoennes, 1998). Economic abuse consists, inter alia, of sabotage
actions that act as barriers to the employability and job performance of the victim (Swanberg and
Macke, 2006; Adams et al., 2008).1 For example, there is evidence of abusers starting fights and
keeping their partners up all night before an important job interview or test. Others are disrupting
their partner’s work effort or try to damage their reputation at work. Some perpetrators sabotage
their partner’s child care arrangements etc. The various tactics used by abusers share the common
IEarlier versions of this paper were presented at the Geary Institute, FEDEA Madrid, EEA in Malaga, CESifo
Area Conference on Employment and Social Protection, University College Dublin, and at the Universities of Munich,
Konstanz and St Gallen. We are grateful to participants for their comments.
Email addresses: Dan.Anderberg@rhul.ac.uk (Dan Anderberg), rainer@ifo.de (Helmut Rainer)
1Indeed, the so-called Work/School Abuse Scale (W/SAS) survey instrument was constructed to measure inter-
ference with employment and education by abusive males (Riger et al., 2000).
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feature that they thwart the victim’s work or training efforts, in some cases through direct physical
violence.2
Economic abuse has so far remained a relatively “unseen side” of domestic violence. Indeed,
recent research in economics on the causes of domestic violence has focused mainly on physical
abuse. The most commonly used framework, which builds on the cooperative approach, assumes
that some males have a preference for physical violence and women tolerate it in return for higher
transfers (Tauchen et al., 1991; Farmer and Thiefenthaler, 1997; Aizer, 2010).3 While this literature
has been insightful, no attempt has yet been made to understand intrahousehold economic abuse.
In particular, no explanation has been put forward regarding what might drive husbands who, as
their wives enter employment or increase hours of work, turn into saboteurs and contrive to pull
them back down. With this paper, we aim to fill this void by presenting a theory of intrahousehold
sabotage which rationalizes economically abusive behavior within partnerships.4
The key feature of our analysis is to think of economically abusive behavior as emerging en-
dogenously from the internal organization of the family. More specifically, our theory is predicated
on the idea that incentives for sabotage are a consequence of spousal disagreements regarding
their respective economic roles, modeled here as having its root cause in the time allocated to
the provision of family-specific public goods. To this effect, we present a model which depicts
family behavior as a noncooperative game. However, we also assume that partners have caring
preferences, which implies that, for couples with “near complete caring”, equilibrium behavior is
nearly “completely cooperative”. Hence the caring parameter effectively parameterizes the degree
of noncooperation. In the model, each partner derives utility from own private consumption and
from a household public good which is produced using time-inputs by both partners. In the non-
cooperative equilibrium, spouses do not provide the efficient level of the family public good, and
each partner would like the other to work less in the labor market and to contribute more time
to household production activities. We allow for transfers between the partners. Transfers serve
two purposes. First, a partner may use a transfer to support the other’s consumption. Second, a
transfer by one partner may also serve the purpose of influencing the other’s time allocation.
The only gender asymmetry in the model is that men are assumed to have the option of using
economically abusive behavior. A motivating fact for this assumption is that most victims of
domestic violence in general and economic abuse in particular are women. Economic abuse in our
model is an instrumental activity that is directly targeted at women’s labor market opportunities.
This modeling approach is motivated by the observation, outlined in detail below, that abusive
males routinely sabotage their partner’s labor market activities. In particular, we will identify
instrumental incentives for economic abuse with the husband’s equilibrium utility being locally
decreasing in the wife’s earnings capacity. We assume that, by behaving economically abusive, the
husband can damage his partner’s earnings capacity through direct and indirect interference with
work efforts.
2According to the literature, the examples highlighted above are repeatedly reported by victims of domestic
violence (see, e.g., Johnson, 1995; Brandwein and Filiano, 2000; Raphael and Tolman, 2000; Swanberg and Logan,
2004; Swanberg and Macke, 2006)
3Others have argued that intimate partner violence represents expressive behavior that is triggered when conflict-
ual situations escalate out of control (Card and Dahl, 2011) or suggested that males use partner violence to extract
transfers from the victim’s family (Bloch and Rao, 2002). See below for a brief survey.
4Throughout the paper, the terms “economic abuse” and “sabotage” are synonymous. Similarly, the terms
“husband/wife” and “partner” are used interchangeably since the legal distinction between marriage and cohabitation
plays no role in our analysis.
2
We obtain three main sets of results. First, we derive and analyze the set of parameter values
under which intrahousehold sabotage emerges as instrumental equilibrium behavior. A key result
is that the husband’s incentives for economic abuse are effectively inversely U-shaped in the wife’s
relative wage. On the one hand, when the wife has a very low wage relative to the husband, he
supports her financially through a monetary transfer and she will voluntarily specialize completely
in household production. Since the wife’s post-transfer time allocation choice coincides with her
partner’s preferred outcome, the relationship stays free of economically abusive behavior. On the
other hand, when the wife has a very high wage relative to the husband, her labor market income
is too important for the household for him to sabotage her earnings capacity. Instead, incentives
for economic abuse obtain when her relative wage is at an intermediate level. In this case, it
is individually rational for the wife to enter employment, but the husband’s preferred choice is
for her to stay specialized at household production. The husband attempts to shift the woman’s
employment choice towards his preferred specialization outcome through his monetary transfer.
However, from the perspective of the husband, he would be better off is her wage was lower, thus
giving him an incentive to sabotage her work efforts. Hence the model effectively predicts that
economic abuse is associated with the wife’s labor supply being contentious and economic roles in
the family “hanging in the balance”. Second, we demonstrate that economic abuse will not occur
among couples’ whose behavior is characterized by complete cooperation. In the current framework,
intrahousehold sabotage as an equilibrium phenomenon requires some degree of noncooperation
between partners and is ultimately triggered by the misalignment of spousal preferences regarding
the intrahousehold allocation of time. Even though this result should not come as a surprise, it
underscores the difference between our approach and bargaining theories of domestic violence where
physical abuse may obtain under complete cooperation between spouses. Third, our framework
serves to highlight some policy dilemmas as it allows us to think about the consequences of welfare
policy. We show that various welfare policies (e.g., unconditional family cash benefits) aimed
universally at all households shift the incidence of economic abuse without necessarily reducing it.
In order to reduce economic abuse, different types of households have to be targeted with different
types of instruments.
Central to our model is the notion of economic abuse by males being “instrumental” and directly
related to women’s economic activity. The notion that abusive males target their partners’ work
or schooling efforts is well-documented in the literature (Raphael 1995, 1996). Sabotage tactics
used by abusive males noted in the literature include, but are not limited to, the destruction of
homework assignments, keeping women up all night with arguments and fights before key tests
or job interviews, turning off alarm clocks, destroying or hiding clothes, or failing to show up as
promised for child care or transportation (Tjadden and Thoennes, 1998; Zachary, 2000). As a
result, employed victims may experience lower productivity, higher absenteeism rates, and more
frequent tardiness (Tolman and Rosen, 2001; Swanberg and Macke, 2006). However, a husband
may also play the role of saboteur through innuendo, e.g. through spreading rumors about her at
her place of work.5 Finally, covert forms of sabotage may occur on the home front when a man
tries to reinforce his wife’s responsibility for traditional female duties or accuses her of neglecting
the family.
Interference with work effort by abusive males appears to be commonplace. Tolman and Rosen
(2001) in a study of 753 female welfare recipients in Michigan document that 48 percent of those who
5It is increasingly common to come across articles in popular magazines as varied as Forbes or Elle about “sabo-
taging husbands” using tactics of rumor, innuendo or discrediting against their employed wives (Bazelon, 2009).
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had experienced severe violence in the preceding 12 months also reported some form of direct work
interference. Similarly, in a study of 1,082 applicants for public assistance in Colorado, Pearson et.
al (1999) found that 44 percent of domestic violence victims reported that their abusive partners
had prevented them from working.
Our work is related to two different strands of research on household behavior, on domestic
violence and non-cooperative family decision-making. The main theories of domestic violence
that have been put forward or used in the recent economic literature can be broadly placed into
three categories: “bargaining theory”, “signaling theory”, and “cue-triggered theory”. Bargaining
theory (Tauchen et al., 1991; Farmer and Thiefenthaler, 1997; Aizer, 2010) posits that some males
have preferences for inflicting pain or injury onto their female partners, and emphasizes intra-
household bargains whereby husbands effectively bribe their wives into accepting some level of
physical violence by offering side payments in return. Thus, acts of violence may become part
of a Pareto-improving trade between spouses. The key prediction of bargaining theories is that
increasing a woman’s relative wage increases her bargaining power and monotonically decreases
the level of violence by improving her outside option. In signaling theory (Bloch and Rao, 2002),
a male’s “satisfaction” with his marriage is private information. While satisfied husbands would
never engage in violence, dissatisfied husbands have less aversion towards using violence and may
do so in order to signal their dissatisfaction, thereby extracting transfers from the wife’s family.
In the behavioral “cue-triggered theory” (Card and Dahl, 2011), males may fundamentally have a
preference against being abusive but may become violent as a result of “losing control” in response
to some negative cues, the exposure to which they control in order to maximize their own ex ante
utility.
Our approach to modeling economic abuse entails characterizing family decision-making as
non-cooperative.6 We advocate this approach even through the dominant premise in the theory of
the family is that households are able to reach efficient outcomes (Becker 1991; Manser and Brown,
1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Chiappori, 1992; Chiappori et al., 2002). Indeed, in our setting,
households will reach (near) efficient outcomes if their caring is (nearly) complete. Complete or
near complete caring may well characterize a large proportion of existing couples, thus implying
that assuming efficiency is a reasonable first approximation of typical household behaviour in other
settings. It does not, however, imply that assuming efficiency is a useful approach to modeling
intrahousehold sabotage. The key point that we would stress here is an obvious one, namely that
the idea that domestic abuse of any kind is efficient and welfare enhancing is at odds with the
universal view that it is a harmful activity that society should try to prevent.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we set out our model of economic abuse, discuss our
assumptions, and analyze the equilibrium of the model. We then in Section 3 investigate policy.
The main focus here will be to show that welfare policies shift the incidence of domestic violence in
predictable ways. Section 4 provides a simple Cobb-Douglas example which illustrates our results.
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the empirical relevance of our results and some pointers
for future research.
6Various kinds of non-cooperative models have been put forward in the literature, e.g. by Bergstrom, 1989;
Lundberg and Pollak, 1993; Konrad and Lommerund, 1995; Chen and Woolley, 2001; and Anderberg, 2007.
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2. The Model
2.1. The Formal Setup
Consider an economy consisting of households, where, in each household, there is a husband
(h) and a wife (s). Each partner i (i = h, s) obtains utility from private consumption, ci, and a
home-produced household public good, Q. For simplicity we assume separable preferences with a
common utility function over the household public good. Formally, let the preferences of partner
i be represented by
ui(ci, Q) = vi(ci) + Z(Q), (1)
where vi is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and limci→∞ v
′
i(ci) =
0 and limci→0 v
′
i(ci) = ∞. Each spouse has a unit of active time endowment, to be allocated be-
tween market work, `i, and home production, qi ≡ 1 − `i. We denote the household production
function by Q = Q (qh, qs). The properties of Z(·) and Q (·, ·) are discussed below.
We assume “caring preferences”: each partner puts a weight of µ ∈ (0, 1/2) on the private
utility of the spouse and a (larger) weight (1− µ) on own private utility. The total preferences of
partner i are thus
Ui(ci, c−i, Q) = (1 − µ)ui(ci, Q) + µu−i(c−i, Q). (2)
Note that the limit as µ approaches one-half corresponds to a situation of full cooperation. In
this case, the partners pursue the same objectives and hence will operate on the Pareto frontier.
Conversely, the limit as µ approaches zero corresponds to a situation of pure noncooperation. Our
model, therefore, also allows consideration of how the incidence of domestic abuse varies with the
degree of (non)cooperation within a partnership.
When working in the labor market, partner i can earn a wage wi ∈ Wi ≡ [wi, wi], i = h, s.
We will refer to the wage profile (wh, ws) as a couple’s “type” and assume that couple-types are
distributed according to some continuous distribution G on the support Wh ×Ws (with positive
density on the entire support).
The model also allows for unearned income yi. However, for the baseline scenario, we assume
yi = 0. Positive unearned income will be considered in the context of welfare policy in Section 3.
Finally, partner i can make a transfer ti ≥ 0 to the spouse, and we let t ≡ th − ts denote the net
transfer from the husband to the wife.
By substituting for ui and Q in (2), individual i’s total preferences can be written as
Ui(ci, c−i, `i, `−i) = (1− µ)vi(ci) + µv−i(c−i) + z(1− `h, 1− `s), (3)
where z(qh, qs) ≡ Z(Q(qh, qs)) is the composition of the utility from Q with the household produc-
tion function. We assume that the partners’ time inputs into household production are “indepen-
dent”:
Assumption 1 (Household Production Technology). The composite function z (qh, qs) is additively
separable,
z (qh, qs) = zh (qh) + zs (qs) ,
with each zi (·) being twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave and
with limqi→0 z
′
i (qi) =∞ (i = h, s).
Throughout the analysis we view household time allocation choices as being associated with
a Nash equilibrium point. By contrast, much of the existing literature on household behavior
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implicitly appeals to folk theorems to argue that efficient resource allocations can be sustained
through repeated interaction. This argument ignores, however, that these results apply if and only
if individuals are infinitely patient, i.e., in the limit as discount factors tend to one. If one allows
more realistically for heterogeneity of discount factors, then families would sort endogenously into
cooperative and non-cooperative resource allocation regimes. Recent econometric evidence from
a intrahousehold time allocation model which allows for this type of heterogeneity suggests that
a sizeable proportion of couples—roughly 25 percent—behaves non-cooperatively (Del Boca and
Flinn, 2012). There are other issues in the analysis of repeated games (e.g., finiteness of interactions,
renegotiation proofness, completeness of information) which imply that it cannot be taken for
granted that households generally achieve Pareto-efficient outcomes. Thus, it is important to allow
for non-cooperative behavior when analyzing the behavior of couples, especially in the context of
wasteful and destructive phenomena such as abuse or sabotage.
We adopt the following timing of events. First, the husband chooses whether or not to engage in
sabotage. Second, the spouses simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose transfers. Finally, the
spouses simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide on how to allocate their unit time endowment
between market work and the production of the household public good. The analysis that follows
assumes complete information and characterizes the choices of the two family members in reverse
order. The only fundamental gender asymmetry in our model is with respect to the husband’s
ability to sabotage the wife’s labor market activities. We assume that sabotage behavior has no
other direct effect than lowering the wife’s earnings potential. For example, a husband might
undermine his wife’s job prospects and wage by being rude to her employer or coworkers or by
deliberately limiting her transportation choices. While physical abuse may sometimes also serve
as an instrument for sabotage, we are not considering severe forms of violence that harm both the
victim’s job prospects and productivity in home production. Since sabotage behavior interferes
with the victim’s potential wage in the labor market, it may be thought of as instrumental behavior
by the husband to achieve some control over the time allocation of the wife.
2.2. The Time Allocation
Taking unearned incomes, transfers and the spouse’s time allocation as given, partner i solves
max
`i∈[0,1]
{Ui (ci, c−i, `i, `−i) |ci = wi`i + Yi} , (4)
where
Yi ≡ yi − ti + t−i. (5)
The first-order condition for an interior optimum reads
(1− µ) v′i(wi`i + Yi)wi ≤ z
′
i(1− `i). (6)
Note that (6), which will hold with equality when `i > 0 and with inequality when `i = 0, only
involves the “own” wage and unearned income. Thus, each partner has a strictly dominant time
allocation strategy, which we denote `i (wi, Yi). By Assumption 1, we can be sure that neither
partner will fully specialize in market work.
In general, the effect of i’s own wage on `i is ambiguous due to conflicting income and substi-
tution effects. We will assume, however, that the substitution effect dominates so that individual
i’s labor supply is non-decreasing in the own wage. This assumption captures the idea that the
husband can reduce the wife’s formal labour supply by interfering with her earnings capacity.
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Assumption 2 (Effect of Own Wage on Labor Supply). The substitution effect dominates the
income effect so that individual i’s labor supply is non-decreasing in her own wage:
∂`i (wi, Yi)
∂wi
≥ 0 for i = h, s.
We denote the wage elasticity of labour supply by
εi (wi, Yi) ≡
∂`i (wi, Yi)
∂wi
wi
`i (wi, Yi)
for i = h, s, (7)
which, by Assumption 2, is also positive. We define the individual’s earnings function as
mi (wi, Yi) ≡ wi`i (wi, Yi) for i = h, s. (8)
While the individual’s earnings will be decreasing in Yi, it must be that
∂mi (wi, Yi)
∂Yi
∈ (−1, 0) . (9)
This follows immediately from the fact that, with separable preferences, the individual’s consump-
tion must be increasing in Yi. The fact that partner i’s earnings are decreasing in Yi reflect that
his/her labor supply is decreasing in Yi. Looking ahead towards the transfer decisions, this implies
that each partner i can induce the other to reduce his/her labor supply by increasing the transfer
ti.
It is also straightforward to demonstrate that partner i’s labor supply is decreasing in the
caring parameter µ. This follows from the fact that, at any µ < 1/2, there is an inefficiency in
the chosen labor supplies. In particular, each partner works “too much” from the perspective of
the spouse. To see this, note that partner i values an increase in the earnings of partner −i at
µv′
−i (c−i) whereas partner −i values it more highly at (1− µ) v
′
−i (c−i). The closer µ is to one-half,
the more each partner “internalizes” this effect and hence chooses a lower level of market work.
We will also make a set of further assumptions which we impose directly on the labor supply
functions rather than on the primitives as the corresponding assumptions on the primitives would
be highly involved and contain difficult-to-interpret third derivatives of v (·) and z (·).
Assumption 3 (Second Derivatives of Labor Supply).
1. Convexity of labor supply and earnings in unearned income:
∂2`i (wi, Yi)
∂Y 2i
≥ 0;
2. Positive cross-partial for earnings:
∂2`i (wi, Yi)
∂Yi∂wi
≥ −
1
wi
∂`i (wi, Yi)
∂Yi
.
3. Concavity of labor supply in wage — decreasing labor supply elasticity:
∂2`i (wi, Yi)
∂w2i
≤ −
(1− εi (wi, Yi)) εi (wi, Yi)
w2i /` (wi, Yi)
;
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Part (i), which is equivalent to earnings being a weakly convex function of unearned income, is
used below to demonstrate that, if one partner is making a transfer to the other, then the donor’s
utility is a concave function of the transfer. Many common utility specifications, including the
Cobb-Douglas and CES case (see below), satisfy this assumption through `i (wi, Yi) being linear in
Yi.
Part (ii) is equivalent to the cross-partial of the earnings function m (w, Y ) being non-negative.
This assumption is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the transfer given from partner
i to −i being decreasing in the recipient’s wage when the recipient is working. This condition
is satisfied with equality in the Cobb-Douglas case and holds in the CES case if and only if the
elasticity of substitution exceeds unity.
Part (iii) says that the individual’s labour supply is a sufficiently concave function of the wage.
The particular assumption is equivalent to the wage elasticity εi (wi, Yi) being decreasing in wi.
7
This is used below to argue that the husband’s incentives for abuse eventually diminish as the
wife’s wage grows. The assumption is satisfied by Cobb-Douglas and CES preferences whenever
Yi ≥ 0. Taken together, the assumptions also imply that the elasticity εi (wi, Yi) is increasing in
unearned income.8
2.3. The Transfer Decision
Each partner has two potential motives for transferring income to the spouse. First, to support
the spouse’s consumption. Second, to induce the spouse to work less in the labor market. We will
characterize here the transfer ti from partner i to the spouse −i under the assumption that −i
is not making any transfer back, i.e. that t−i = 0 (and under the maintained assumption of zero
unearned income for both partners). Below we will verify that, indeed, in equilibrium at most one
partner will be making a positive transfer.
We will demonstrate that partner i’s choice of ti, when viewed as a function of the spouse’s
wage w−i, has four “regimes”. First, in the low-wage regime, partner i makes a pure “benevolent
transfer”, denoted t0i (wi, w−i), and −i strictly prefers not to work. Second, in the low-to-medium
wage regime, partner i makes a “crowding out” transfer, denoted t1i (wi, w−i), and −i just prefers
not to work. Third, in the medium-to-high wage regime, partner i makes a positive transfer,
denoted t2i (wi, w−i), and −i works some strictly positive amount of time. Finally, in high wage
regime, partner i does not make a transfer and −i works some strictly positive amount of time.
The following proposition formalizes partner i’s transfer behavior:
Proposition 1 (Individual Transfer Choices). For given wi > 0 (and given yi = y−i = 0 and
t−i = 0) there exist three critical wages for the spouse, w
k
−i(wi), k = 0, 1, 2, ranked increasingly in
k and each strictly increasing in wi, such that:
1. When w−i < w
0
−i(wi), partner i makes a (“benevolent”) transfer t
∗
i = t
0
i (wi, w−i), which
is strictly increasing in wi and independent of w−i, and −i (strictly) fully specializes in
household production, `∗
−i = 0.
7To see this, note that differentiating (7) yields that wi
∂εi
∂wi
= ∂
2`i
∂w2
i
w2
i
`i
+ ∂`i
∂wi
wi
`i
(
1− w
`i
∂`i
∂wi
)
.
8Differentiating (7) yields that `i
∂εw
i
∂Yi
= ∂
2mi
∂Yi∂wi
−
∂`i
∂Yi
(
1 + ∂`i
∂wi
wi
`i
)
which is positive due to the cross-partial of
the earnings function being positive, and ∂`i/∂Yi < 0 and ∂`i/∂wi > 0.
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2. When w−i ∈ [w
0
−i(wi), w
1
−i(wi)], partner i makes a (“crowding-out”) transfer t
∗
i = t
1
i (wi, w−i),
which is independent of wi and strictly increasing in w−i, and −i (just) fully specializes in
household production, `∗
−i = 0.
3. When w−i ∈ [w
1
−i(wi), w
2
−i(wi)], partner i makes an (“interior”) transfer t
∗
i = t
2
i (wi, w−i),
which is strictly increasing in wi and strictly decreasing w−i, and −i works positive hours,
`∗
−i > 0.
4. When w−i ≥ w
2
−i(wi), partner i makes no transfer t
∗
i = 0, and −i works positive hours,
`∗
−i > 0.
The benevolent transfer t0i (wi, w−i) equalizes the marginal utility of each partner’s consumption
as viewed from the perspective of i’s preferences under the assumption that the spouse has no
earnings,
(1− µ)v′i(ci) = µv
′
−i(c−i). (10)
This is an equilibrium when the spouse chooses not to work when provided with the benevolent
transfer. Indeed, the first critical wage, w0
−i(wi), is defined as the highest w−i at which −i prefers
not to work upon receiving t0i (wi, w−i).
Whenever w−i > w
0
−i(wi), −i would choose to work some strictly positive hours if provided
with t0i (wi, w−i). For a range of w−i, up to a second critical wage w
1
−i(wi), partner i then increases
the transfer ti so as to (just) ensure that the spouse chooses not to work. Thus, the “crowding
out” transfer t1i (wi, w−i) is characterized by the first order condition for −i’s labor supply (6)
holding with equality at `−i = 0. As an increase in w−i strengthens −i’s labor supply incentives, it
also increases t1i (wi, w−i). As the spouse’s wage increases further, it eventually no longer becomes
optimal for partner i to completely crowd out the spouse’s labor supply. However, the transfer
chosen by partner i even in this case will be aimed in part at reducing the spouse’s labor supply.
The first order condition characterizing the “interior” t2i (wi, w−i) transfer is
(1− µ) v′i (ci) = v
′
−i (c−i)
[
µ− (1− 2µ)
∂m−i
∂Y−i
]
. (11)
Note that t2i (wi, w−i) contains both a benevolent aspect and a labor supply reducing aspect. The
two remaining critical wages, w1
−i(wi) and w
2
−i(wi), are characterized by the recipient’s labor
supply at the interior transfer going down to zero and the interior transfer itself going down to
zero, respectively.
Figure 1 illustrates the transfer made by partner i as a function of the spouse’s wage w−i for a
given own wage wi. Note in particular how the transfer is a non-monotonic function of w−i.
The hatched line in Figure 1 shows the effect of an increase in the own wage wi. From Propo-
sition 1 we know that an increase in wi increases both the benevolent transfer t
0
i (wi, w−i) and the
interior transfer t2i (wi, w−i) which in turn increases all three critical wages, w
k
−i(wi), k = 0, 1, 2.
As the figure illustrates, this implies that the equilibrium transfer made by partner i, denoted
t∗i (wi, w−i) is (weakly) increasing in the own wage wi.
Lemma 1 (Effect of Own Wage on Transfers). The equilibrium transfer t∗i (wi, w−i) > 0 is weakly
increasing in wi.
In characterizing the transfer made by partner i we have assumed that no simultaneous transfer
was made from the spouse back to partner i. This can be easily verified.
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w−i
ti
w0−i(wi) w
1
−i(wi) w
2
−i(wi)
t0i (wi, w−i)
t1i (wi, w−i)
t2i (wi, w−i)
Figure 1: The transfer made by partner i as a function of the spouse’s wage
Lemma 2 (No Simultaneous Transfers). If partner i makes a positive equilibrium transfer, t∗i (wi, w−i) >
0, then the spouse −i strictly prefers not to make a transfer, t∗
−i (w−i, wi) = 0.
Indeed, the proof of Lemma 2 demonstrates that, for any given wi there will exist a range
of spousal wages w−i such that both i and −i choose not to make any transfer in equilibrium.
Hence in a population of couples with a distribution of wage-profile types, equilibrium transfers
will be zero for a positive measure of couples. In the limiting case of complete caring (µ = 1/2)
the measure of couples who make no transfers reduces to zero as, in the limit, the partners agree
on the consumption allocation and this allocation will, generically, not coincide with the partners’
income profile.
To summarize, if one partner makes an equilibrium transfer to the spouse, he/she does so
to support the spouse’s private consumption and to influence the spouse’s time allocation away
from market work. We now ask whether and when the husband has an incentive to resort to an
additional means of influence, namely economic abuse.
2.4. Incentives for Intrahousehold Sabotage
We identify incentives for economic abuse with the husband’s equilibrium utility being locally
decreasing in the wife’s earnings capacity. The following result, which is interpreted after its
statement, reveals that the risk of intrahousehold sabotage is present when the economic roles
within the partnership, in a sense, “hang in the balance”.
Proposition 2 (Economic Incentives for Sabotage). For a given wh (and given yh = ys = 0)
there exists a critical wage w∗s (wh) such that the husband has an incentive to engage in sabotage
behavior when ws ∈ (w
0
s(wh), w
∗
s(wh)). The critical wage w
∗
s (wh) strictly exceeds w
1
s (wh) and is
weakly increasing in wh.
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The proposition states that the husband’s incentives for economic abuse kick in when his
benevolent transfer is not sufficient to induce the wife to fully specialize in household production,
i.e. when ws > w
0
s(wh), and they continue up to some level of the wife’s wage at which she is
working in equilibrium. The result has a simple intuition. For any ws ≤ w
0
s(wh), the husband
makes the “benevolent transfer” t∗h = t
0
h(wh, ws), which is sufficient to induce the wife to fully
specialize in household production. Her wage is low enough to be, in effect, irrelevant and any
further reduction in ws would leave the equilibrium entirely unchanged. Thus, the relationship will
remain abuse free.
Consider then the case where ws ∈ (w
0
s(wh), w
1
s(wh)), implying that the husband chooses the
crowding out transfer t∗h = t
1
h(wh, ws). In this case, the husband is making a transfer which exceeds
the one he would voluntarily make, but the wife is still not working in equilibrium. The husband’s
equilibrium utility would be increased by a reduction in the wife’s wage as this would allow him to
reduce his transfer towards his benevolent transfer. Thus, he has an economic incentive to sabotage
her earnings potential.
Finally, consider the case where ws > w
1
s(wh) so that, in equilibrium, the wife works and the
husband either makes the “interior” transfer t2h(wh, ws) or no transfer at all. In this case, the impact
of a marginal increase in the wife’s wage on the husband’s equilibrium utility can be written as
v′s(c
∗
s)`
∗
s [µ− (1− 2µ) εs (ws, t
∗
h)] , (12)
and it can be demonstrated that this expression is strictly negative as ws approaches w
1
s (wh) from
above (see proof of Proposition 2). This establishes that incentives for economic abuse will also be
present for some couples where the wife works. The expression in (12) is negative if and only if
µ <
εs (ws, t
∗
h)[
1 + 2εs
(
ws, t∗h
)] . (13)
As the wife’s wage increases, her labour supply responsiveness decreases, thus decreasing the right
hand side.9 Instead, for a high enough wife’s wage, his equilibrium utility will be increasing in her
wage as he benefits, through caring, from her higher earnings.
Note that in characterizing the husband’s incentives for economic abuse, we have ignored any
potential transfer from the wife to the husband. However, it should be clear enough that any
transfers from the wife to the husband will weaken the husband’s abuse incentives as we know
from Lemma 1 that the transfer that the wife makes to the husband will be increasing in her wage.
Hence by interfering with her earnings capacity, the husband would also reduce the transfer that
he obtains from her.
Finally, note that economic incentives for intrahousehold sabotage obtain from the inefficiency
in public good provision associated with incomplete caring. The following result shows that, when
partners behave nearly “completely cooperative”, then they will abstain from abuse altogether:
Proposition 3 (Household Mode of Behavior and Intrahousehold Sabotage). In the limit with
complete caring, µ→ 12 , the set of wages profiles ws ∈ (w
0
s(wh), w
∗
s(wh)) at which the husband has
incentives to engage in sabotage behavior reduces to the empty set.
9When the husband is making the interior transfer t2h (wh, ws) this effect is further reinforced by this transfer
decreasing in ws.
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While this result is highly intuitive, it is at same time in stark contrast to the insights provided
by bargaining theories of domestic violence. Indeed, our framework implies that, with complete
caring, couples pursue a common objective and the household operates at an agreed point on the
Pareto frontier. In this cooperative-like setup, an act of sabotage which reduces the wife’s earnings
capacity would then simply reduce the utility possibility set and would hence never increase the
husband’s equilibrium utility. In bargaining theories, by contrast, acts of violence occur when
they increase the utility possibility set and consequently become part of a Pareto-improving trade
(involving compensating side-payments) between spouses.
3. The Effect of Welfare Policy
Our analysis provides an instrumental basis for behavior which many others attribute to a
taste for sadism or a pleasure of exercising power. This is important because tastes are hard to
manipulate, while incentives are less so. Thus, our theoretical structure allows to get a clear sense
of the margins where we may see a change in the incidence of economic abuse when a government
intervenes with families. In this section, we will consider two very simple examples of policy
interventions: a wage subsidy policy and a flat-rate benefit policy, with either policy potentially
being gender-specific.
Consider first a wage subsidy policy and let σi ≥ 0 denote the subsidy rate that applies to
partner i, i = h, s. The effective wage for partner i is hence w˜i ≡ (1 + σi)wi, and we refer to wi as
the individual’s primary wage. We are interested in understanding how a wage subsidy offered to
either gender affects the range of wife’s primary wages at which the husband engages in abusive
behavior.
The analysis of wage subsidies is much simplified by the insight that what matters for abuse
incentives are the partners’ effective wages. This immediately implies that a wage subsidy provided
to women will shift downwards the set of wives’ primary wages at which the husband has incentives
for sabotage. For example, a woman whose primary wage is low enough that she, in the absence of
a wage subsidy, would choose not to work at the husband’s benevolent transfer may find that, once
provided with a wage subsidy, she would prefer to work given the same transfer. Hence a wage
subsidy provided to women may expose some low wage women to the risk of abuse. Conversely,
a woman whose primary wage would not be high enough to put her beyond the risk of economic
abuse, may find that a positive wage subsidy increases her effective wage enough to do so.
Similarly, since the boundaries of the abuse region, w0s (wh) and w
∗
s (wh), are increasing in the
husband’s wage, it follows that a wage subsidy provided to the husband shifts upwards the set of
wives’ primary wages at which the husband has incentives for sabotage. Hence, a wage subsidy
provided to the husband will reduce economic abuse against some low wage women who, with the
husband’s subsidy, will choose not to work at his benevolent transfer. Conversely, by reducing
the women’s relative wage, a wage subsidy provided to males, will put into the abuse region some
women whose wages would otherwise have been sufficiently large to put them beyond the risk of
economic abuse.
Proposition 4 (Effect of Wage Subsidies).
1. A wage subsidy given to the husband, σh > 0, increases both the lower- and the upper bound,
w0s(wh) and w
∗
s(wh), of the set of wage profiles at which the husband has equilibrium incentives
to engage in sabotage behavior.
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2. A wage subsidy given to the wife, σs > 0, decreases both the lower- and the upper bound,
w0s(wh) and w
∗
s(wh), of the set of wage profiles at which the husband has equilibrium incentives
to engage in sabotage behavior.
While the effect of wage subsidies are highly intuitive, the effect of flat-rate benefits are perhaps
somewhat more surprising. So far we have focused on the case where the unearned income for each
partner was zero, yi = 0 (i = h, s). We will now look at how a marginal increase, starting from
zero, in either partner’s unearned income affects the equilibrium in general and abuse incentives in
particular, and will refer to this as the effect of an introduction of a gender-specific flat rate benefit.
A crucial aspect for understanding the impact of flat rate benefits on abuse incentives is whether,
in equilibrium, there is a positive transfer from either partner to the spouse. If, in equilibrium,
either partner is making a positive transfer, a local “income pooling property” applies:
Lemma 3 (Income Pooling). If, in equilibrium, partner i is making a positive transfer to the
spouse, t∗i > 0, then ∂t
∗
i /∂yi − ∂t
∗
i /∂y−i = 1.
The key implication of local income pooling is that, locally (i.e. for small variations), only total
household unearned income, yh + ys, matters for the equilibrium outcome. This in turn implies
that the effect of the introduction of a flat-rate benefit is necessarily the same irrespective of which
partner it is given to.
Consider then first the effect of the introduction of a flat-rate benefit on the lower bound on
the set of wife’s wages at which the husband has incentives for economic abuse, w0s (wh). At the
wage profile
(
wh, w
0
s (wh)
)
the husband is making a positive (benevolent) equilibrium transfer (see
Proposition 1), and hence there is local income pooling. Moreover, as intuition suggests, providing
the husband with a flat rate benefit will make him increase his benevolent transfer, which in turn
will expand the set of wife’s wages at which she will have no incentive to work, thus raising the
lower bound w0s (wh) on the abuse region. Due to income pooling, the effect of the introduction of
a flat rate benefit provided to the wife is identical.
Consider next the impact of a small flat benefit on the upper bound on the set of wife’s wages
at which the husband has incentives for economic abuse, w∗s (wh). If w
∗
s (wh) < w
2
s (wh) then the
husband is making a positive (interior) transfer at the wage profile (wh, w
∗
s (wh)) (see Proposition
1), and hence there is again local income pooling. If the husband is provided with small flat benefit
he will increase his transfer. The indirect effect of this additional unearned income accruing to
the wife is to increase the her labour supply wage responsiveness, which enhances the husband’s
sabotage incentives, thus increasing w∗s (wh). From local income pooling, we know that the effect
of a flat rate benefit to the wife is the same. If w∗s (wh) < w
2
s (wh), then the husband is not making
any transfer at the wage profile (wh, w
∗
s (wh)). In this case a flat benefit provided to the husband
has no impact on w∗s (wh). In contrast, a flat benefit provided to the wife directly increases her
wage responsiveness, giving the husband stronger abuse incentives, thus again increasing w∗s (wh).
Proposition 5 (Effect of Flat Rate Benefits).
1. The introduction of a flat rate benefit yi, provided either to the husband or to the wife, equally
strictly increases the lower bound w0s (wh) of the set of wife’s wages at which the husband has
incentives to engage in sabotage behavior.
2. If w∗s (wh) < w
2
s (wh), the introduction of a flat rate benefit yi, provided either to the husband
or to the wife, equally strictly increases the upper bound w∗s (wh) of the set of wife’s wages at
which the husband has incentives to engage in sabotage behavior.
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3. If w∗s (wh) > w
2
s (wh), the introduction of a flat rate benefit ys provided to the wife strictly
increases w∗s (wh) whereas a corresponding flat rate benefit yh provided to the husband has no
effect on w∗s (wh).
Our results, so far, suggest that welfare policies may shift the incidence of economic abuse
without necessarily reducing it: wage subsidies to women shift the incidence of economic abuse
downwards in the female wage distribution. Conversely, unconditional family cash benefits shift
shift the incidence of economic abuse upwards in the female wage distribution. Each policy in
isolation may, therefore, have undesirable effects on the risk of domestic abuse for some women.
These observations permit us to deduce what type of policy mix would, according to the model,
reduce the incidence of economic abuse. Such a policy mix would require: (1) cash benefits to
couples in the low-wage and low-to-medium wage regime, which would allow males to prevent the
inefficiency of non-cooperative equilibrium by means of a benevolent transfer instead of sabotage;
and (2) wage subsidies to women in the medium-to-high wage regime, which would reinforce the
importance of female earnings for the household, and so induce males to abstain from sabotage
behavior.
4. A Cobb-Douglas Example
In this section we provide a simple Cobb-Douglas example which, in addition to illustrating
the model, allows us to highlight a few more of its features. Hence we let
ui(ci, Q) = ln ci + 2α lnQ and Q (qh, qs) = q
1/2
h q
1/2
s . (14)
In this specification we include the parameter α > 0 as a measure of the relative importance of the
household produced good.
A feature of the Cobb-Douglas specification (with zero exogenous unearned incomes) is that
the nature of the household equilibrium depends only on the relative wages ws/wh, not on wage
levels. In particular, maintaining the assumption that yh = ys = 0, the critical wages partitioning
the transfer regimes can all be written in the form
wk
−i (wi) = C
k (µ, α)wi, (15)
with
C0 (µ, α) =
αµ
(α+ 1) (1− µ)
C1 (µ, α) =
α (α+ µ)
3α (1− µ)− µ+ α2 + 1
C2 (µ, α) =
(α+ µ)
(1 + α− µ)
.
(16)
In a similar way, the upper boundary on the set of wife’s wages at which the husband has incentives
for economic abuse can be written in the form
w∗s (wh) = C
∗ (α)wh with C
∗ (α) =
α
α+ 1
. (17)
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Figure 2: Illustration of the equilibrium.
As (17) indicates, in the Cobb-Douglas example, the upper bound on the set of wife’s relative
wages at which the husband has incentives for economic abuse wage does not actually depend on
µ but depends positively on α. Note that C2 (µ, α) > C∗ (α). Hence in the Cobb-Douglas case,
economic abuse always coexist with positive transfers from the husband to the wife. This result
follows from the fact that, with Cobb-Douglas preferences and with ys = 0, the wife’s labour supply
responsiveness, εs (ws, th), drops to zero when she does not receive a transfer from the husband.
Hence the husband cannot influence the wife’s labour supply by saboting her wage unless he also
makes a positive transfer.
Figure 2(a) illustrates how the space of wage-profiles is partitioned into regions with different
nature/direction of transfers and labour supply status for the case of µ = 1/4 and α = 1. At
ws < w
0
s (wh) the husband makes the “benevolent” transfer t
0
h (wh, ws) and the wife strictly prefers
not to work. At ws ∈
(
w0s (wh) , w
1
s (wh)
)
the husband makes the “crowding out” transfer t1h (wh, ws)
and the wife just chooses not to work. At ws ∈
(
w1s (wh) , w
2
s (wh)
)
the husband makes an “interior”
transfer t2h (wh, ws) and the wife works positive hours. At higher wife’s wages, the husband does
make any transfer to the wife. As, in this example, preferences are symmetric across the two
genders, corresponding regions apply when the wife’s wage exceeds the husbands.
Figure 2(b) illustrates in the same example the set of wage profiles at which the husband has
incentives to engage in sabotage behavior. The figure illustrates how incentives for sabotage obtain
for a set of wage profiles around those where the wife enters the labour market.
The Cobb-Douglas example can also be used to illustrate the impact of caring and of the
relative importance of household produced goods. Figure 3(a) illustrates the three critical relative
wages Ck (µ, α), k = 0, 1, 2 as well as C∗ (α) as a function of the caring parameter µ when α = 1.
The example illustrates how an increase in µ decreases the set of wage profiles (wh, ws) at which
the husband has equilibrium abuse incentives. The example also illustrates how the incentives for
economic abuse disappear when µ approaches 1/2. In the limit where µ = 1/2 the couple has a
common objective and the household operates on the Pareto frontier. An act of sabotage which
reduces ws would then simply reduce the utility possibility set and would hence never increase the
husband’s equilibrium utility.
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Figure 3: Comparative statics.
Figure 3(b) illustrates the same critical relative wage functions, now as a function of α given
µ = 1/4. This figure highlights how an increase in the relative importance of household production,
as parameterized by α, tends to increase the incentives for economic abuse. This reflects how, in
the current model, economically abusive behavior obtains as a result of disagreements between
the two partners regarding the allocation of time in the presence of household production: if the
importance of household produced goods diminish, so do the incentives for sabotage.
Above we outlined some general results regarding the effect of wage subsidies and flat-rate
benefits on the incidence of economic abuse. In line with the result that only relative wages matter
in the Cobb-Douglas, it is only the relative subsidy rate that matters for abuse incentives.10
Figure 4(a) illustrates the effect of a 50 percent relative subsidy to women (σs = 1/2, σh = 0). A
corresponding relative wage subsidy to men would shift the abuse region in the opposite direction.
Figure 4(b) illustrates the effect of a small flat rate benefit. Noting that w∗s (wh) < w
2
s (wh)
holds in the Cobb-Douglas case, it follows that the effect of the introduction of a flat rate benefit
is the same irrespective of to which partner it is provided.11 In line with Proposition 5 the figure
illustrates how a small benefit yi > 0 (provided to either partner) shifts the abuse region upwards.
One potential objection to the above analysis would be that we have neglected the possibility
that some households would find it advantageous to purchase market-produced substitutes for
household production. Hence we ask here: What would happen if partners could buy market
substitutes for the their own time input into household production? Intuitively, we might expect
that sabotage will not occur among couples who find it advantageous to replace their own time
input into household production with market-based substitutes, since the contentious issue within
10In particular in the presence of wage subsidies σh and σs, each of the critical relative wages in (16) and (17) are
rescaled by a factor (1 + σh) / (1 + σs).
11It should be noted that the analysis above was for the case case of yi = 0 in order to ensure that someone in the
household always chooses to work in equilibrium and to ensure that a partner’s benevolent transfer to the spouse will
be positive. It was for the same reason that the claims in Proposition 5 focused on the introduction of a “small” flat
benefit starting from zero unearned income, that is, the derivatives of the equilibrium with respect to yi taken at the
point where yi = 0. Figure 4b is drawn from a small strictly positive amount of unearned income, but ignores the
possibility of both partners not working and of a zero benevolent transfers. Hence the figure should be considered
only as illustrative and it should be recognized that it is not entirely complete for couples with wage profiles where
one or both partners have very low wages.
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the partnership then no longer revolves around labor supply decisions but around public good
expenditures.
To see this formally, consider a household production function where each partner can choose
both own time (qi) and a bought-in market good (xi) as inputs into household production. In line
with the particular form of the partners’ utility functions and the household production function
used above, let
ui(ci, Q) = ln ci + 2α lnQ and Q = (qh + pixh)
1
2 (qs + pixs)
1
2 ,
where pi > 0 is the marginal productivity of the bought-in market good relative to own time. The
budget constraint now becomes
ci + pxi + wiqi = wi + Yi
with p the price of the market input.
This modification on the household production side allows a higher degree of heterogeneity in
the division of labor within the household. In particular, the nature of the household equilibrium
now depends both on relative wages and on wage levels:
 On the one hand, high-wage individuals (wi >
p
pi ) will optimally choose to work full-time
(q∗i = 0) and to allocate their earnings partly to buying in household services. Formally:
c∗i =
[
1− µ
1− µ+ α
] [
wi + Yi
]
and px∗i =
[
α
1− µ+ α
] [
wi + Yi
]
High-wage individuals may still receive a transfer from their partners, provided their relative
wage is sufficiently low.12 Transfers now serve no purpose beyond supporting the partner’s
private consumption and encouraging expenditures on bought-in market goods.
12Formally, partner −i will receive a positive transfer from partner i as long as w−i < C
2(µ, α)wi [see equation
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 On the other hand, low-wage individuals (wi <
p
pi ) will optimally refrain from buying in
market substitutes (x∗i = 0). The time allocation choices of low-wage individuals—as well as
the transfers they receive from their partners—are identical to those in the baseline model.
Incentives for labor market sabotage survive in equilibrium when males are partnered with low-
wage women (ws <
p
pi ). As in the baseline model, these incentives are non-monotonic with respect
to relative wages.13 However, the option to substitute market-based services for their own time in
home production eliminates the risk of sabotage for high-wage women (ws >
p
pi ). The intuition is
simple. With market-based services being optimally substituted for time in household production,
the contentious issue within the household becomes expenditures on bought-in market goods.
Indeed, each partner would like the other to spend less on own consumption and more on household-
related services. But sabotage behavior targeted at female wages only works to reduce expenditures
on bought-in market goods further. Thus, males do not have an incentive to interfere with their
partners’ earnings capacity. Overall, therefore, the above analysis emphasizes that it is when
females face low wages in an absolute sense that their partners may have incentive to sabotage
their economic activity.
5. Conclusion
Research in economics on domestic abuse has taken off in the last two decades and has produced
insightful theory and empirical evidence. However, research in this field to date has, almost exclu-
sively, focused rather narrowly on physical violence. Research outside economics, by contrast, has
long emphasized that a typical pattern of domestic abuse also includes economic abuse as a tactic
used by abusers to control their partners’ behavior. Economic abuse includes sabotage actions that
act as barriers to the employability and job performance of the victim. We believe that economics
has much to add to the study of this type of behavior, and our specific concern in this paper has
been to understand why some husbands sabotage their partner’s work efforts.
To that end, we have proposed a theoretical framework which revolves around the notion of
economic abuse being instrumental and directly related towards women’s participation in employ-
ment. At the heart of the model is an intra-household disagreement about the allocation of time
between market work and home production. We have shown that this mechanism generates a
non-monotonic relationship between the gender wage gap and the incidence of economic abuse.
With a low relative wage, it is individually rational for a woman—being supported financially by
her partner—to fully specialize at home. The woman’s chosen allocation of time coincides with
her partner’s preferred choice, and the relationship stays free of economically abusive behavior.
With an intermediate relative wage, it is privately rational for a woman to look for work and enter
employment (at the level of financial support that her husband would voluntarily provide her with),
but the husband’s preferred choice is for her to stay specialized in household production. While
he will increase his financial support in order to induce her not to enter the labour force, he also
(16)]. The equilibrium level of the transfer is given by
t∗i =
wi(µ+ α)− w−i(1− µ+ α)
1 + 2α
.
13Formally, if ws <
p
pi
, incentives for sabotage continue to be present for relative wages in the interval
(w0s(wh), w
∗
s(wh)).
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has an incentive to directly interfere with her labour market opportunities and hence resorts to
sabotage tactics. Finally, with a high relative wage, a woman’s earned income is too important for
a male partner to interfere with her earnings capacity. Overall, therefore, our model predicts that
economic abuse in the form of labor market sabotage is associated with a woman’s labor supply
being contentious and economic roles in the family hanging in the balance.
In addition to suggesting an interpretation for the economic abuse component of domestic
violence, our analysis also serves to highlight some policy dilemmas. Our results suggest that
policies aimed at improving the economic situation of families may shift the incidence of economic
abuse without necessarily reducing it. For example, unconditional family cash benefits shift the
incidence of economic abuse upwards in the female wage distribution, while wages subsidies to
women may have the opposite effect. In order to reduce the risk of economic abuse, therefore,
different types of households have to be targeted with different types of policy measures. This
underlines the complexities policy makers have to negotiate when facing the problem of economic
abuse, which many analysts consider to be just as harmful as other forms of domestic abuse.
It is important to acknowledge that this paper is a purely theoretical exercise. In general,
we know precious little about the empirical importance of the channels identified by our theory.
Most of the empirical literature has taken as its null hypothesis that the risk of domestic violence
monotonically decreases with women’s relative wages. This paper establishes an alternative hy-
pothesis based on the idea that men may have an incentive to impose negative outcomes on their
partners when spousal preferences regarding the intrahousehold allocation of time are misaligned.
This alternative hypothesis explains existing evidence on economically abusive behavior and gives
direction for future empirical research.
There are several directions in which our analysis could be expanded. From a theoretical
perspective, it would be interesting to embed the present framework in a model where women
have the option of quitting abusive relationships and use the unifying model to examine how
the internal organization of the family and outside options interact in shaping the incidence of
domestic abuse. From an empirical perspective, it would be interesting to use survey data to
deduce some of the key parameters of our model and to generate quantitative predictions from the
estimated parameter values. This would allow us to get a feel for the empirical relevance of the
non-monotonic relationship between the gender wage gap and the incidence of abuse as predicted
by the theory. These and other issues are important and challenging topics for future research. In
the meantime, our analysis demonstrates the value of going beyond preference-based bargaining
models of domestic violence and to incorporate instrumental incentives into economic explanations
of spousal abuse against women.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. It should be noted that the proposition is derived under the assumption of zero
unearned income for each partner. Hence while we retain the general notation for unearned incomes, yi and
y−i, all equations etc. in the proof of the current proposition should are evaluated at yi = y−i = 0.
The proposition is proven through a series of lemmas. First, define the “benevolent” transfer, t0i (wi, w−i),
from partner i to −i implicitly as the solution to the following equation:
(1− µ) v′i
(
mi
(
wi, yi − t
0
i (wi, w−i)
)
+ yi − t
0
i (wi, w−i)
)
= µv′−i
(
y−i + t
0
i (wi, w−i)
)
. (A1)
Lemma A.1. The benevolent transfer t0i (wi, w−i) is (i) a uniquely identified continuous function with
t0i (wi, w−i) ∈ (0, wi), (ii) strictly increasing in wi and independent of w−i.
Proof. Both sides of (A1) are continuous functions of ti. Using (9) it follows that the left hand side is
strictly increasing in ti. The right hand side is strictly decreasing in ti. Moreover, as ti approaches either 0
the right hand side approaches infinity whereas if ti approaches wi, the left hand side approaches infinity.
Hence (A1) must have a unique solution in the interval (0, wi). The effect of an increase in wi follows from
the fact that ∂mi/∂wi > 0. Independence of w−i follows from the fact that it does not feature directly in
(A1).
Next, define the “crowding out” transfer, t1i (wi, w−i), from partner i to −i implicitly as the transfer at
which −i just chooses zero labour supply:
v′−i
(
y−i + t
1
i (wi, w−i)
)
=
1
w−i
z′−i (1)
(1− µ)
. (A2)
Lemma A.2. The crowding out transfer t1i (wi, w−i) is (i) a uniquely identified continuous function, (ii)
strictly increasing in w−i, independent of wi,(iii) approaches 0 as w−i approaches 0.
Proof. Uniqueness and continuity follow immediately from differentiability and strict concavity of v−i (·).
Monotonicity in w−i follows from strict concavity of v−i (·). Independence of wi follows from the fact that
wi does not feature directly in (A2). Finally, note that as w−i → 0
+, any positive transfer will strictly
induce −i not to work. Hence t1i (wi, w−i) (which is the smallest transfer at which −i chooses not to work)
must approach zero.
For large enough w−i, the crowding out transfer will not be “affordable” to i. Hence we implicitly define
wmax−i (wi) as the w−i at which the crowding out transfer corresponds to i’s maximum earnings.
t1i
(
wi, w
max
−i (wi)
)
= wi. (A3)
From the properties of t1i (wi, w−i) in Lemma A.2 it follows that w
max
−i (wi) is uniquely identified and strictly
increasing in wi.
We next define w0−i(wi) as w−i which equates the benevolent and the crowding out transfer,
t0i
(
wi, w
0
−i(wi)
)
= t1i
(
wi, w
0
−i(wi)
)
. (A4)
Lemma A.3. The critical wage w0−i (wi) is a uniquely identified continuous and strictly increasing function
of wi, and w−i < (>)w
0
−i (wi) implies t
0
i (wi, w−i) > (<) t
1
i (wi, w−i).
Proof. Immediate from the properties of t0i (wi, w−i) and t
1
i (wi, w−i) given in Lemma A.1 and A.2.
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In order to analyze the transfer decision it is useful to write −i’s utility as a (continuous) function of ti
in the following way
Ui (ti;wi, w−i) ≡ (1− µ) vi (mi (wi, yi − ti) + yi − ti) + µv−i (m−i (w−i, y−i + ti) + y−i + ti)
+z
(
1−
mi (wi, yi − ti)
wi
, 1−
m−i (w−i, y−i + ti)
w−i
)
, (A5)
remembering that for any ti ≥ t
1
i (wi, w−i) the recipient, −i, chooses zero labor supply. We can now establish
strict concavity of −i’s utility in ti.
Lemma A.4. Ui (ti;wi, w−i) is strictly a strictly concave function of ti with a “downward kink” at ti =
t1i (wi, w−i).
Proof. Differentiating (A5) with respect to ti and evaluating at some ti < t
1
i (wi, w−i) yields, after substi-
tuting using (6),
∂Ui (ti;wi, w−i)
∂ti
= − (1− µ) v′i (ci) + v
′
−i (c−i)
[
µ− (1− 2µ)
∂m−i
∂Y−i
]
. (A6)
When evaluating at some ti > t
1
i (wi, w−i), the same expression holds but with ∂m−i/∂Y−i = 0 as −i strictly
prefers not to work at such a transfer. At ti = t
1
i (wi, w−i), the derivative (A6) does not exist. However,
the left and the right derivatives both exist and are given by (A6), with and without the ∂m−i/∂Y−i term
included respectively. Since ∂m−i/∂Y−i < 0 (see eq. (9)), the left derivative exceeds the right derivative.
Differentiating a second time and evaluating at some ti < t
1
i (wi, w−i) yields
∂2Ui (ti;wi, w−i)
∂t2i
= (1− µ) v′′i (ci)
(
1 +
∂mi
∂Yi
)
+ v′′−i (c−i)
(
1 +
∂m−i
∂Y−i
)[
µ− (1− 2µ)
∂m−i
∂Y−i
]
−v′−i (c−i) (1− 2µ)
∂2m−i
∂Y 2−i
. (A7)
When evaluating at some ti > t
1
i (wi, w−i), the same expression holds but with ∂m−i/∂Y−i = 0 etc. It
follows from (9) and Assumption 3, that (A7) is strictly negative at any ti 6= t
1
i (wi, w−i).
From Lemma A.4 it follows that i’s optimal transfer (if positive) is either characterized by ti 6=
t1i (wi, w−i) and (A6) being equal to zero, or by ti = t
1
i (wi, w−i) and (A6) being strictly positive at all
ti < t
1
i (wi, w−i) and strictly negative at all ti > t
1
i (wi, w−i)). For future reference it is also useful to note
that, when evaluated at some ti < t
1
i (wi, w−i),
∂2Ui (ti;wi, w−i)
∂ti∂w−i
= v′′−i (c−i)
∂m−i
∂w−i
[
µ− (1− 2µ)
∂m−i
∂Y−i
]
− v′−i (c−i) (1− 2µ)
∂2m−i
∂Y−i∂w−i
< 0, (A8)
where the inequality follows from Assumption 3. When evaluated at some ti > t
1
i (wi, w−i) the expression
in (A8) is identically equal to zero as −i then strictly prefer to not work. Note also that
∂2Ui (ti;wi, w−i)
∂ti∂wi
= − (1− µ) v′′i (ci)
∂mi
∂wi
> 0. (A9)
Lemma A.5. At w−i ≤ w
0
−i (wi), i’s optimal transfer is the benevolent transfer t
0
i (wi, w−i).
Proof. Suppose that w−i ≤ w
0
−i (wi) and i chooses ti = t
0
i (wi, w−i). Since t
0
i (wi, w−i) ≥ t
1
i (wi, w−i) (see
Lemma A.3), it follows from the definition of the benevolent transfer in (A1) that ∂Ui/∂ti given by (A6)
equals zero at this transfer, thus confirming that it is an optimal choice for i.
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Next we define implicitly a second critical recipient’s wage. To this end, consider the left derivative of
(A5) with respect to ti, evaluated at the limit point ti = t
1
i (wi, w−i),
∂Ui
(
t1i (wi, w−i) ;wi, w−i
)
∂t−i
= 0, (A10)
where we note that the left derivative is given by (A6) with the inclusion of the ∂m−i/∂Y−i term. The
second critical wage, denoted w1−i (wi), is implicitly defined as the w−i at which (A10) equals zero.
Lemma A.6. The critical wage w1−i (wi) (i) is a uniquely identified continuous and strictly increasing
function of wi, and (ii) is strictly larger than w
0
−i (wi).
Proof. Evaluating atw−i ≤ w
0
−i (wi), and using that, at any such recipient’s wage, t
1
i (wi, w−i) ≤ t
0
i (wi, w−i),
one can easily verify that the left hand side of (A10) is positive. For large enough w−i, (A10) will, on the
other hand, be negative. To see this, note that when w−i approaches w
max
−i (wi), t
1
i (wi, w−i) approaches wi,
implying that i’s consumption approaches zero. Given continuity of the left hand side of (A10) in w−i at
least one solution to the equation in (A10) exists, and any solution strictly exceeds w0−i (wi).
To demonstrate uniqueness of w1−i (wi), note that (A10) is strictly decreasing in w−i both directly (see
eq. A8), and indirectly via t1i (wi, w−i) being increasing in w−i (Lemma A.2) and concavity of Ui in ti
(Lemma A.4). Finally, that w1−i (wi) is increasing in wi follows from simple comparative statics using (A9)
and recalling that t1i (wi, w−i) is independent of wi (Lemma A.2)
Lemma A.7. At w−i ∈
(
w0−i(wi), w
1
−i(wi)
)
, i’s optimal transfer is the crowding-out transfer t1i (wi, w−i).
Proof. For w−i ∈
(
w0−i(wi), w
1
−i(wi)
)
we now have that the right derivative of Ui (ti;wi, w−i) with respect
to ti evaluated at ti = t
1
i (wi, w−i) is strictly negative (since, for such w−i, t
1
i (wi, w−i) > t
0
i (wi, w−i)) while
the left derivative is strictly positive. Hence, by global concavity of Ui (ti;wi, w−i) in ti (Lemma A.4) it
follows that t1i (wi, w−i) is i’s optimal transfer.
We define a third critical recipient’s wage, denoted w2−i (wi), as the smallest w−i at which i chooses to
make a zero transfer. Specifically, we define w2−i (wi) implicitly through the following equation,
∂Ui
(
0;wi, w
2
−i (wi)
)
∂ti
= 0. (A11)
Lemma A.8. The critical wage w2−i (wi) (i) is a uniquely identified continuous and strictly increasing
function of wi, and (ii) is strictly larger than w
1
−i (wi).
Proof. From Lemmas A.5 and A.7, we know that for any w−i ≤ w
1
−i (wi), i’s optimal transfer is either
t1i (wi, w−i) or, if w−i ≤ w
0
−i (wi) , t
0
i (wi, w−i) which then exceeds t
1
i (wi, w−i). Hence for any w−i ≤
w1−i (wi), i’s optimal transfer is strictly positive, implying that ∂Ui (0;wi, w−i) /∂ti is strictly positive at any
such w−i. Next we note that ∂Ui (0;wi, w−i) /∂ti is strictly decreasing in w−i as −i’s earnings are increasing
in w−i and due to Assumption 3 (and, under natural conditions, for large enough w−i the derivative becomes
negative). This demonstrates that w2−i (wi) is unique and exceeds w
1
−i (wi). That w
2
−i (wi) increases in wi
follows from (A9).
Lemma A.9. At w−i ∈
(
w1−i (wi) , w
2
−i (wi)
)
, i’s optimal transfer is an “interior” transfer t2i (wi, w−i),
where t2i (wi, w−i) ∈
(
0, t1i (wi, w−i)
)
and is strictly increasing in wi and strictly decreasing in w−i. At
w−i ≥ w
2
−i (wi), i’s optimal transfer is the zero transfer.
Proof. For w−i > w
1
−i(wi), the left derivative of Ui (ti;wi, w−i) with respect to ti evaluated at ti =
t1i (wi, w−i) is strictly negative, implying that i’s optimal transfer is given by some ti < t
1
i (wi, w−i) (at
which the recipient works some positive amount of time). The optimal transfer in this case is either strictly
positive and characterized by the derivative in (A6) being equal to zero, or equal to zero with the derivative
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in (A6) being non-positive at ti = 0. Per definition, w
2
−i (wi) is the unique recipient’s wage above which
the derivative of Ui (ti;wi, w−i) with respect to ti evaluated at ti = 0 is negative. We denote the strictly
positive transfer made at w−i ∈
(
w1−i (wi) , w
2
−i (wi)
)
by t2i (wi, w−i). Monotonicity of t
2
i (wi, w−i) in wi and
w−i then follows immediately from (A8) and (A9).
Proposition 1 follows in a straightforward manner, using Lemmas A.1 to A.9.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that, in equilibrium, partner i is making a positive transfer to partner −i. It
then follows that
(1− µ) v′i (ci) ≤ v
′
−i (c−i)
[
µ− (1− 2µ)
∂m−i
∂Y−i
]
. (A12)
To see this, note that if i makes an interior transfer t2i (wi, w−i) to −i, then (A12) holds with equality as it
is the first order condition characterizing the interior transfer. If i makes a benevolent transfer t0i (wi, w−i)
to −i, then (A12) holds with equality, but with ∂m−i/∂Y−i = 0 as −i strictly prefers not to work. Finally,
if i is making the crowding out transfer t1i (wi, w−i) to −i, then (A12) holds with inequality as the left
derivative of Ui with respect ti at t
1
i (wi, w−i) is positive (see proof of Proposition 1). If partner −i is then
also making a positive transfer to i, the same inequality with i and −i interchanged also holds. Combining
the two inequalities to eliminate the marginal utilities yields that
(1− µ)
2
≤
[
µ− (1− 2µ)
∂mi
∂Yi
] [
µ− (1− 2µ)
∂m−i
∂Y−i
]
. (A13)
However, this is a contradiction since the right hand side is, for any µ ∈ [0, 1/2) and
(
∂mh
∂Yh
, ∂mh
∂Yh
)
∈
(−1, 0)× (−1, 0), in the open interval
(
µ2, (1− µ)2
)
.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let U∗i (wi, w−i) denote the equilibrium utility of partner i. At any ws ≤ w
0
s (wh),
the husband makes the “benevolent transfer” t0h (wh, ws) which is independent of ws, and the wife strictly
prefers not to work in equilibrium. A marginal reduction ws does not affect any aspect of the equilibrium,
and hence, in particular, does not increase the husband’s equilibrium utility U∗h (wh, ws).
At any ws ∈
(
w0s (wh) , w
1
s (wh)
]
the husband chooses the “crowding-out transfer” t1h (wh, ws) and, in
equilibrium, the wife just chooses not to work. At such a ws it follows that
∂U∗h (wh, ws)
∂ws
= − [(1− µ) v′h (c
∗
h)− µv
′
s (c
∗
s)]
∂t1h (wh, ws)
∂ws
< 0, (A14)
where the sign follows from the fact that, as ws > w
0
s (wh), t
1
h (wh, ws) > t
0
h (wh, ws) (see Lemma A.3),
implying that the term in brackets is positive.
At any wage ws ∈
(
w1s (wh) , w
2
s (wh)
)
the husband chooses the “interior transfer” t2h (wh, ws) and, in
equilibrium, the wife is working some positive amount of time in the labour market. At such a ws it can be
shown, after simplifying using the first order conditions for labour supplies and the characterization of the
“interior” transfer, that
∂U∗h (wh, ws)
∂ws
= µv′s (c
∗
s)
[
ws
∂`∗s
∂ws
+ `∗s
]
− z′s (q
∗
s )
∂`∗s
∂ws
(A15)
Substituting for z′s (q
∗
s ) in the final term using the first order condition for the wife’s labour supply and
collecting terms, this can be rewritten as
∂U∗h (wh, ws)
∂ws
= v′s (c
∗
s) `
∗
s {µ− (1− 2µ) εs (ws, ys + t
∗
h)} . (A16)
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It should be noted that the husband’s incentives for abuse are “smooth” at ws = w
1
s (wh): taking the limit
of (A14) as ws → w
1
s (wh)
−
and the limit of (A16) as ws → w
1
s (wh)
+
, and using simple comparative statics,
yields that
lim
ws↗w1s(wh)
∂U∗h (wh, ws)
∂ws
= lim
ws↘w1s(wh)
∂U∗h (wh, ws)
∂ws
= −v′s (c
∗
s) (1− 2µ)ws
∂`∗s
∂ws
< 0. (A17)
Thus the husband’s incentives for abuse extend to some ws at which the wife works in equilibrium. Moreover,
equation (A16) holds also at any ws ≥ w
2
s (wh), at which the husband makes no transfer to the wife and the
wife works in equilibrium.
From (A16) it follows that, for ws > w
1
s (wh), the husband has equilibrium incentives for abuse until
µ
(1− 2µ)
= εs
(
w∗s (wh) , ys + t
2
h (wh, w
∗
s (wh))
)
. (A18)
Note, by Assumption 3.2, εs directly decreases in ws and increases in Ys. Moreover, as ws > w
1
s (wh), the
husband is either making the interior transfer t2h (wh, ws), which by Lemma A.9 is decreasing in ws, or a zero
transfer. If the husband is making the interior transfer, then an increase in ws further leads to a reduction
in εs through the reduction in the wife’s total unearned income. Hence the right hand side of (A18) is a
decreasing function of ws, implying that if, given wh, it first fails at some w
∗
s (wh) > w
1
s (wh), it also fails at
any w′s > w
∗
s (wh).
Finally, to see that w∗s (wh) weakly increases in wh, note that wh only enters (A18) via the husband’s
interior transfer. If w∗s (wh) > w
2
s (wh), then the husband is making zero transfer at ws = w
∗
s (wh) in which
case marginal variations in wh has no impact on the critical wage w
∗
s (wh). If ws ∈
(
w1s (wh) , w
2
s (wh)
)
, then
the husband is making a positive transfer at ws = w
∗
s (wh) which, by Lemma A.9, is increasing in wh. A
marginal increase in wh then increases Ys via the husband’s equilibrium transfer, and thus increases εs and
w∗s (wh).
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the allocation problem
max
(ci,`i)
{
1
2
[vh (ch) + vs (cs)] + z (1− `h, 1− `s) |ch + cs = wh`h + ws`s + yh + ys
}
(A19)
the first order conditions for which imply
v′h (ch) = v
′
s (cs) (A20)
wi
2
v′i (ci) ≤ z
′
i (1− `i) (A21)
where the latter condition holds with equality when `i > 0. The solution to the above problem has a
“reservation wage property”. In particular, the wife does not work at the solution to (A19) if and only if
ws ≤ w
r
s (wh) for some w
r
s (wh).
The non-cooperative equilibrium in the limiting case where µ → 1/2 corresponds to the solution to
(A19). Note in particular, that the characterization of both the “benevolent” transfer and the “interior”
transfer reduce to the “equalized marginal utility” condition (A20), and the labour supply condition (A21)
corresponds to the limit of (6). (As will be clear shortly, in the limit, “crowding out” transfers will not
occur). Recalling that w0s (wh) is defined as the highest ws wage at which the wife chooses not to work at
the husband’s benevolent transfer, it follows that w0s (wh) → w
r
s (wh) as µ → 1/2. Consider then w
∗
s (wh)
defined as the highest wife’s wage at which ∂U∗h/∂ws given in (A16) is strictly negative. Note however that,
in the limit as µ → 1/2, ∂U∗h/∂ws → v
′
s (c
∗
s) `
∗
s/2 which is thus positive for any ws at which the wife is
working. Hence it follows that w∗s (wh) → w
r
s (wh) as µ → 1/2. The abuse region
(
w0s (wh) , w
∗
s (wh)
)
thus
reduces to the empty set as as µ→ 1/2.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Extend the notation to include the subsidy rates σi, i = h, s in the notation for the
lower and upper bound on the interval of wife’s wages at which the husband has equilibrium incentives
for abuse, w0s (wh;σh, σs) and w
∗
s (wh;σh, σs). What matters for the equilibrium outcome are the partners’
“effective wages” w˜i ≡ (1 + σi)wi, i = h, s. This implies that the following two equations hold as identities
w0s (wh, σh, σs) =
w0s (wh (1 + σh) , 0, 0)
(1 + σs)
and w∗s (wh, σh, σs) =
w∗s (wh (1 + σh) , 0, 0)
(1 + σs)
. (A22)
It immediately follows that both critical wages are decreasing in σs. To see that both critical wages are also
increasing in σh recall that both w
0
s (wh) and w
∗
s (wh) are increasing in wh (see Lemma A.3 and Proposition
2).
Proof of Lemma 3. Recall that Yi ≡ yi − ti + t−i denotes i’s total unearned income (inclusive of transfers).
If partner i is making an equilibrium transfer t∗i > 0 to −i (implying that t
∗
−i = 0, see Lemma 2), then
individual i is effectively choosing, on the margin, the intra-household allocation of total unearned income
subject to Yi + Y−i = yi + y−i. As yi and y−i only feature in the form of their sum it follows that
∂Y ∗i /∂yi = ∂Y
∗
i /∂y−i, or equivalently, 1 − ∂t
∗
i /∂yi = −∂t
∗
i /∂y−i. Note that this holds irrespective of
whether i’s transfer is “benevolent”, “crowding-out”, or “interior”.
Proof of Proposition 5. Using the definition of w0s (wh) in (A4) and differentiating with respect to unearned
income for partner k yields
∂t0h
∂ws
∂w0s (wh)
∂yk
+
∂t0h
∂yk
=
∂t1h
∂ws
∂w0s (wh)
∂yk
+
∂t1h
∂yk
. (A23)
When k = h, the first term on the left hand side and the second term on the right hand side are, by
Proposition 1, both equal to zero. Hence
∂w0s (wh)
∂yh
=
∂t0h/∂yh
∂t1h/∂ws
> 0, (A24)
where the sign follows from simple comparative statics which shows that t0h (wh, ws) strictly increases in yh
and, from Proposition 1. By local income pooling, ∂w0s (wh) /∂ys = ∂w
0
s (wh) /∂yh.
When w∗s (wh) < w
2
s (wh) the upper bound w
∗
s (wh) is implicitly defined by (A18). Differentiating with
respect to the wife’s unearned income yields, after using Lemma 3,
∂w∗s (wh)
∂ys
= −
∂t2
h
∂yh
∂εs
∂ws
/ ∂εs
∂Ys
+
∂t2
h
∂ws
> 0, (A25)
where we note that the denominator is strictly negative by Assumption 3 and Proposition 1, and simple
comparative statics show that the numerator is strictly positive. By local income pooling the introduction
of yh must have the same positive effect on w
∗
s as ys.
When w∗s (wh) > w
2
s (wh) equation (A18) reduces to µ/ (1− µ) = εs (w
∗
s (ws) , ys). As yh does not
feature in this equation it immediately follows that a (small) yh has no impact on w
∗
s (wh). Moreover, by
Assumption 3 the labour supply elasticity is decreasing in the own wage and increasing in unearned income,
which together imply that w∗s (wh) increases in ys.
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